Hypothetically, science proves free will isn't real

[Ignorant]

Exactly. Because choices still exist either way the question is whether the choices are free. Exactly.

What makes a choice free?

[Edwardo Piet]

A choice can be free in the compatabilist sense. Meaning the sense of free choice that no one denies we have anyway. The trivially true fact that some actions are voluntary and some are involuntary, that there's a difference between a choice with a gun to your head and a choice without a gun to your head. That definition of free choice no one denies and is trivially true. Trivial not because it's insignificant, but because it's extremely undeniably obvious.

That's how comptabilists dodge the real question. Whether a choice can be free in the sense of us being able to do otherwise -- In the sense of being able to determine our path, not by rules of determinism... is a logically incoherent concept because determinism implies a regress that prevents us from doing that, and indeterminism denies any kind of being able to determine our path at all.

So a choice an be free in the compatabilist soft deterministic sense. I'm a hard determinist because I think compatabilsit dodges the question.

Actually, to be more accurate I am a hard incompatabilist: although I believe in determinism as cause and effect and a determinined uinvierse makes sense to me... I consider free will of the incompatabilist sense impossible in an indeterministic universe too, for reasons described above. I'm not a soft determinist or compatabilist because I don't identify as someone who espouses for a trivially true definition of free will or free choice.

[Edwardo Piet]

In short this is my argument against the incompatabilist free will of "could have done otherwise":

If determinism is true a sentient entity cannot determine otherwise because there is no otherwise in determinism.

If indeterminism is true a sentient entity cannot determine otherwise because there is no determining in indeterminism.

[Ignorant]

A choice can be free in the compatabilist sense. Meaning the sense of free choice that no one denies we have anyway. The trivially true fact that some actions are voluntary and some are involuntary, that there's a difference between a choice with a gun to your head and a choice without a gun to your head. That definition of free choice no one denies and is trivially true. Trivial not because it's insignificant, but because it's extremely undeniably obvious.

That's how comptabilists dodge the real question. Whether a choice can be free in the sense of us being able to do otherwise -- In the sense of being able to determine our path, not by rules of determinism... is a logically incoherent concept because determinism implies a regress that prevents us from doing that, and indeterminism denies any kind of being able to determine our path at all.

So a choice an be free in the compatabilist soft deterministic sense. I'm a hard determinist because I think compatabilsit dodges the question.

Actually, to be more accurate I am a hard incompatabilist: although I believe in determinism as cause and effect and a determinined uinvierse makes sense to me... I consider free will of the incompatabilist sense impossible in an indeterministic universe too, for reasons described above. I'm not a soft determinist or compatabilist because I don't identify as someone who espouses for a trivially true definition of free will or free choice.

Defining the ideas relative to compatibilism or (in)determinism is over my head. Any chance you'd care to finish these sentences (or equivalent) for me:

A choice is...

A choice is a free choice if...

Thanks in advance.

[Ignorant]

In short this is my argument against the incompatabilist free will of "could have done otherwise":

In what sense is this meant?

[Angrboda]

Exactly. Because choices still exist either way the question is whether the choices are free. Exactly.

What makes a choice free?

A choice is free if, at minimum, more than one possible world is reachable from the actual world by a deterministic path including the operation of the will.

[Ignorant]

What makes a choice free?

A choice is free if, at minimum, more than one possible world is reachable [1] from the actual world by a deterministic path [2] including the operation of the will. [3]

Could you elaborate on these 3 concepts?

[Edwardo Piet]

In short this is my argument against the incompatabilist free will of "could have done otherwise":

In what sense is this meant?

In the sense of us determining otherwise. If indeterminism is true a set of dice 'could have done otherwise' in the sense that they could have rolled otherwise. But that's no kind of freedom.

The problem is that a free will requires a free determinination, but our will however determined is ultimately determined by other things if determinism is true, and if determinism is false then our will doesn't determine anything. If determinism is true there is no willing at all.

Defining the ideas relative to compatibilism or (in)determinism is over my head. Any chance you'd care to finish these sentences (or equivalent) for me:

A choice is...

A choice is a free choice if...

Thanks in advance.

A choice is free if we define "uncoerced" and "voluntary" to mean "free".

The problem with that is no one defines the existence of that kind of "free choice" or "free will", so the fact many people believe they have more ultimate freedom of that and the argument that was going on by philosophers regarding the relevance of determinism to free will is ignored and not addressed.

It's like philosophers started talking about one thing and then the compatabilist stepped in and changed the subject... (compatablism just means the belief that free will is compatible with determinism. Well, who denies any kind of freedom so broad that it is compatible with a fully deterministic universe anyway? That's why it ignores the whole question. It jumps in with a trival truth.)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXWDkwSyjpU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrS1NCvG1b4

[Ignorant]

In the sense of us determining otherwise. If indeterminism is true a set of dice 'could have done otherwise' in the sense that they could have rolled otherwise. But that's no kind of freedom.

The problem is that a free will requires a free determinination, but our will however determined is ultimately determined by other things if determinism is true, and if determinism is false then our will doesn't determine anything. If determinism is true there is no willing at all.

So would it matter at all if we were 'able to do otherwise' in the sense that we are things with the ability to do the other thing if the requisite circumstances were present?

A choice is free if we define "uncoerced" [1] and "voluntary" [2] to mean "free".

What do 1 and 2 mean? How does this help me to understand what a free choice is?

The problem with that is no one defines the existence of that kind of "free choice" or "free will"

Care to solve the problem and define 'that kind' of free choice? So far your definition is pretty vague (probably due to my ignorance).

It's like philosophers started talking about one thing and then the compatabilist stepped in and changed the subject... (compatablism just means the belief that free will is compatible with determinism. Well, who denies any kind of freedom so broad that it is compatible with a fully deterministic universe anyway? That's why it ignores the whole question. It jumps in with a trival truth.)

This seems like confusing terminology... didn't you say that "could have done otherwise" is the same as "us determining otherwise". The question is not whether or not human actions are determined... the question is who/what does the determining: either the person self-determines action in pure independence from determining influence; the person self-determines action in concert with determining influence; or the person does not determine action at all, rather other, non personally operating processes determine human action.

[Edwardo Piet]

So would it matter at all if we were 'able to do otherwise' in the sense that we are things with the ability to do the other thing if the requisite circumstances were present?

If different circumstances were present then things would be different so we would do things for different reasons. Under determinism there is only one physically possible future at any given moment.

What do 1 and 2 mean? How does this help me to understand what a free choice is?

Compatabilsm says our choices are free if they are voluntary or not coerced. You know what those words mean. An example of a choice being voluntary is a choice that we do intentionally. For example, someone can step on someone's foot intentionally to hurt them as opposed to by accident. An example of a choice being not coerced is a choice under normal circumstances where we are under no coercion: e.g. A choice with a gun to your head is coerced. That's why if someone who is working at a bank and has a gun to their head and is told to hand over the money they might say in retrospect that they "had no choice".

Any definition of free will that merely talks about that kind of choice is a kind of free will that no one deines anyway. Hence why that definition doesn't address the question of whether we can do otherwise. It's because this kind of freedom is perfectly compataible with determinism. It's trivially true and undeniable.

Care to solve the problem and define 'that kind' of free choice? So far your definition is pretty vague (probably due to my ignorance).

Choice that is not coerced.

This seems like confusing terminology...

It's only to those unfamiliar with it. I'm trying to introduce you to it.

didn't you say that "could have done otherwise" is the same as "us determining otherwise".

It would be if it was a coherent concept. We cannot determine otherwise because we ourselves would have to be determined in that case. If we're not, that's because indeterminism is true.

The question is not whether or not human actions are determined... the question is who/what does the determining: either the person self-determines action in pure independence from determining influence; the person self-determines action in concert with determining influence; or the person does not determine action at all, rather other, non personally operating processes determine human action.

Yes my point was one of consistency and coherence. If we do the determining then ultimately we have to be determined too and so ultimately we don't do the determining. My point is the idea of "self-determining" is ultimately incoherent. And when we're talking about normal non-ultimate self-determining that's basically the normal concept of choice that no one doubts.

We ultimately cannot do the determining because if we must ask what determines our own actions and we answer "we did" we must then also ask what determined us to determine our actions, because if we need a cause for one thing, we must continue for the same reason. We can't just decide where the buck stops whether we like, that's inconsistent.